Everything about Political Status Of Taiwan totally explained
The controversy regarding the
political status of Taiwan hinges on whether
Taiwan, including the
Pescadores (Penghu), should remain effectively independent as territory of the
Republic of China (ROC), become
unified with the territories now governed by the
People's Republic of China (PRC), or formally declare independence and become the
Republic of Taiwan. The controversy over the
political status of the Republic of China hinges on whether its existence as a
state is legitimate and recognized.
Currently, Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen (Quemoy),
Matsu and some other minor islands effectively make up the jurisdiction of the
state known as the Republic of China. The ROC ruled
mainland China, and claimed sovereignty over
Outer Mongolia and
Tannu Uriankhai (part of which is present day
Tuva) before losing the
Chinese Civil War and relocating its government to Taipei in December 1949.
Since the ROC
lost its United Nations seat in 1971 (
replaced by the PRC), most sovereign states have switched their diplomatic recognition to the PRC, recognizing or acknowledging the PRC to be the sole legitimate representative of all China. As of January 2008, the ROC maintains official diplomatic relations with 23 sovereign states, although
de facto relations are maintained with nearly all others. Agencies such as the
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office and
American Institute in Taiwan operate as
de facto embassies without official diplomatic status.
The ROC government has in the past considered itself to be the sole legitimate government over
China, as well as its former territories. This position started to be largely ignored in the early
1990s, changing to one that doesn't challenge the legitimacy of PRC rule over mainland China. However, the ROC's claims have never been renounced through a constitutional amendment; both the PRC and the ROC carry out cross-strait relations through specialized agencies (such as the
Mainland Affairs Council of the ROC), rather than through foreign ministries. Different groups have different concepts of what the current formal political situation of Taiwan is. (
See also: Chinese reunification, Taiwan independence, and Cross-Strait relations)
In addition, the situation can be confusing because of the different parties and the effort by many groups to deal with the controversy through a
policy of deliberate ambiguity. The political solution that's accepted by many of the current groups is the following perspective of the
status quo: that is, to unofficially treat Taiwan as a state and at a minimum, to officially declare no support for the government of this state making a formal declaration of independence. What a formal declaration of independence would consist of isn't clear and can be confusing given the fact that the People's Republic of China has never controlled Taiwan since its founding and the fact that the Republic of China, whose government controls Taiwan, considers itself a
de jure sovereign state. The status quo is accepted in large part because it doesn't define the legal status or future status of Taiwan, leaving each group to interpret the situation in a way that's politically acceptable to its members. At the same time, a policy of status quo has been criticized as being dangerous precisely because different sides have different interpretations of what the status quo is, leading to the possibility of war through
brinkmanship or miscalculation.
Background
Some claim that the
Kingdom of Tungning, lasting from 1661 to
1683, was the first
Han Chinese government to rule
Taiwan. From
1683, the
Qing Dynasty ruled
Taiwan as a
prefecture and in 1875 divided the island into two prefectures. In 1887 the island was made into a separate
Chinese province to speed up development in this region. In the aftermath of the
First Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan and the
Pescadores were ceded by the Qing Dynasty to
Japan in 1895. Japanese troops in Taiwan surrendered to the Republic of China at end of
World War II, putting Taiwan under a Chinese government again after
50 years of Japanese rule. The ROC would then claim sovereignty on the basis of the Qing dynasty's administration,
Cairo Declaration,
Potsdam Declaration, and
Japanese Instrument of Surrender, but this became contested by pro-independence groups in subsequent years due to different perceptions of the said documents' legality. Upon losing the Chinese civil war in 1949, the ROC government retreated to Taipei, and kept control over a few islands along the coast of
mainland China and in the
South China Sea. The
People's Republic of China (PRC) was established on the mainland on October 1, 1949, claiming to be the
successor to the ROC.
Quemoy,
Matsu and
Wuchiu on the coast of
Fukien, and
Taiping and
Pratas in the
South China Sea, are part of the ROC's present territory, but were not ceded to Japan. Some arguments supporting the independence of Taiwan don't apply to these islands.
Question of sovereignty over Taiwan
Cession, retrocession and self-determination of Taiwan
China, during the
Qing Dynasty, ceded the island of Taiwan, including the
Pescadores (Penghu), to
Japan "in perpetuity" at the end of the
First Sino-Japanese War by signing the
Treaty of Shimonoseki. In the
Cairo Conference of
1943, the allied powers agreed to have Japan restore "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese", specifically listing "Formosa" and the Pescadores, to the Republic of China upon Japan's surrender. According to both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, this agreement was given legal force by the
Instrument of Surrender of Japan in
1945. The PRC's UN Ambassador,
Wang Yingfan (Chinese 王英凡), has stated multiple times in the UN general committee: "Taiwan is an inseparable part of China’s territory since antiquity" and "both the 1943
Cairo Declaration and the 1945
Potsdam Declaration have reaffirmed in unequivocal terms China’s sovereignty over Taiwan as a matter of international law." The PRC rejects arguments involving the lack of a specific treaty (San Francisco Peace Treaty) transferring Taiwan's sovereignty to China by noting that it wasn't a signatory to any such treaty, making the treaties irrelevant with regard to Chinese claims. The ROC argues that the Treaty of Taipei implicitly transferred sovereignty of Taiwan to it.
On the other hand, a number of supporters of
Taiwan independence argue that Taiwan was only formally incorporated as a Chinese territory under the
Qing Dynasty in 1683, and as a province in 1885. Subsequently, because of the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895, Taiwan had been
de jure part of Japan when the ROC was established in 1912 and thus wasn't part of the Chinese republic. Also, because the
Cairo Declaration was an unsigned press communiqué, the independence advocates argue that the legal effectiveness of the Declaration is highly questionable. Furthermore, they point out that the Instrument of Surrender of Japan was no more than an
armistice, a "
modus vivendi" in nature, which served as a temporary or provisional agreement that would be replaced with a
peace treaty. Therefore, only a military occupation of Taiwan began on Oct. 25, 1945, and both the
Treaty of San Francisco and
Treaty of Taipei hold legal supremacy over the surrender instrument. These treaties didn't transfer the title of Taiwan from Japan to China. According to this argument, the sovereignty of Taiwan was returned to the people of Taiwan when Japan renounced sovereignty of Taiwan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) in 1951, based on the policy of
self-determination which has been applied to "territories which detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War" as defined by article 76b and 77b of the
United Nations Charter and also by the protocol of the
Yalta Conference.
Although the interpretation of the peace treaties was used to challenge the legitimacy of the ROC on Taiwan before the 1990s, the introduction of popular elections in Taiwan has compromised this position. Except for the most extreme Taiwan independence supporters, most Taiwanese support the
popular sovereignty theory and no longer see much conflict between this theory of sovereignty and the ROC position. In this sense, the ROC government currently administering Taiwan isn't the same ROC which accepted Japanese surrender because the ruling authorities were given
popular mandate by different pools of constituencies: one is the mainland Chinese electorate, the other is the Taiwanese constituencies. In fact, current president
Chen Shui-bian has been frequently emphasizing the popular sovereignty theory in his speeches.
However,
as of 2007, the conflict between these two theories still plays a role in internal Taiwanese politics. The popular sovereignty theory, which the
pan-green coalition emphasizes, suggests that Taiwan could make fundamental constitutional changes by means of a popular referendum. The ROC legal theory, which is supported by the
pan-blue coalition, suggests that any fundamental constitutional changes would require that the amendment procedure of the ROC constitution be followed.
Position of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
The position of the PRC is that the ROC ceased to be a legitimate government upon the founding of the former on
October 1,
1949 and that the PRC is the successor of the ROC as the sole legitimate government of
China, with the right to rule Taiwan under the
succession of states theory. Whether the ROC, on the other hand, still has the legitimacy to retake the mainland isn't widely accepted, but disputed.
The ROC argues that it maintains all the characteristics of a state and that it wasn't "replaced" or "succeeded" by the PRC because it has continued to exist long after the PRC's founding. According to the
Montevideo Convention of
1933, the most cited source for the definition of statehood, a state must possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The ROC claims to meet all these criteria as it possesses a sovereign government exercising effective jurisdiction over well-defined territories with over 23 million permanent residents and a full fledged foreign ministry.
The Unification supporters in Mainland China argue that the ROC and PRC are two different factions in the Chinese Civil War, which never legally ended. Therefore both factions belong to the same sovereign country—China. Since Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to China, the secession of Taiwan should be agreed upon by 1.3 billion Chinese citizens instead of the 23 million
ROC citizens who currently live on the Taiwan. Furthermore, they interpret the
UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which states "Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations", to mean that the PRC is granted the sovereignty of all of China, including Taiwan. (The actual Resolution, however, makes no mention of Taiwan or its representation.) Therefore, the PRC believes that it's within their legal rights to extend its jurisdiction to Taiwan, by military means if necessary.
In addition, the PRC argues that the ROC doesn't meet the fourth criterion of the Montevideo Convention, as it's recognized by only 23 (relatively small and poor) countries and has been denied access to international organizations such as the UN. The ROC counters that the pressure the PRC exerts International news organizations often report that "China considers Taiwan a renegade province that must be united with the mainland by force if necessary", even though the PRC doesn't explicitly say that Taiwan is a renegade province. However, official PRC media outlets and officials often refer to Taiwan as "China's
Taiwan Province". (The PRC claims
Quemoy,
Wuchiu and
Matsu as part of its
Fujian Province, and the South China Sea Islands part of its
Guangdong and
Hainan provinces.)
Position of the Republic of China (ROC)
Until the mid-90s, the position of the
Republic of China had been that it was a
de jure sovereign state. "Republic of China," according to the Taiwanese government's definition, extended to both the mainland and the island of Taiwan. Now, the current ruling Democratic Progressive Party prefers to say that Taiwan (as opposed to the ROC) is a de-facto independent nation.
Until 1991, when
President Lee Teng-hui claimed that the government would no longer challenge the rule of the Communists on the mainland, the ROC government under
Kuomintang rule actively maintained that it was the sole legitimate government of China. However, the now defunct
National Assembly never officially changed the national borders, as the
People's Republic of China claims this would be "a precursor to Taiwan independence". The task of changing the national borders now requires a constitutional amendment passed by the
Legislative Yuan and ratified by an absolute majority of all eligible ROC voters, which the PRC has implied would constitute grounds for military attack.
On the other hand, though the
constitution of the Republic of China promulgated in 1946 doesn't state exactly what territory it includes, the draft of the constitution of 1925 did individually list the provinces of the
Republic of China and
Taiwan wasn't among them, since Taiwan was
de jure part of Japan as the result of the
Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895. The constitution also stipulated in Article I.4, that "the territory of the ROC is the original territory governed by it; unless authorized by the
National Assembly, it can't be altered." However, in 1946,
Sun Fo, son of
Sun Yat-Sen and the minister of the
Executive Yuan of the ROC, reported to the National Assembly that "there are two types of territory changes: 1. renouncing territory and 2. annexing new territory. The first example would be the independence of
Mongolia, and the second example would be the reclamation of
Taiwan. Both would be examples of territory changes." Japan renounced all rights to Taiwan in the
Treaty of San Francisco in 1951 and the
Treaty of Taipei of 1952 without an explicit recipient. While the ROC continuously ruled Taiwan after the government was directed to Taiwan by the General Order No.1 to receive Japanese surrender, there has never been a meeting of the ROC National Assembly in making a territory change according to the ROC constitution, though the have mentioned Taiwan "Province." Thus, many pro-Independence advocates point out that the ROC constitution in fact denies its own legality governing Taiwan.
(External Link
)
The now defunct National Assembly passed constitutional amendments that give the people of the "
Free Area of the Republic of China", comprising the territories it controls, the sole right to exercise the sovereignty of the Republic through elections of the President and the entire Legislature as well as through elections to ratify amendments to the ROC constitution. Also, Chapter I, Article 2 of the ROC constitution states that "The sovereignty of the Republic of China shall reside in the whole body of citizens." For some, this suggests that the constitution implicitly admits that the sovereignty of the ROC is limited to the areas that it controls even if there's no constitutional amendment that explicitly spells out the ROC's borders.
In
1999, Taiwan President
Lee Teng-hui proposed a
two-state theory (or a special state-to-state relations theory, ) in which both the
Republic of China (ROC) and the
People's Republic of China (
PRC) would acknowledge that they're two separate countries with a special diplomatic, cultural and historic relationship, and gained immense support within Taiwan. This however drew an angry reaction from the PRC who believed that Lee was covertly supporting
Taiwan independence.
President Chen Shui-bian, the current
ROC President, fully supports that the "
Republic of China is an independent, sovereign country" but holds the view that "Taiwan is the Republic of China" and not the
People's Republic of China. This is suggested in his
Four-stage Theory of the Republic of China. Due to the necessity of avoiding war with the
PRC however, President Chen has refrained from formally declaring Taiwan's independence. Government publications have implied that Taiwan refers to the ROC, and "China" refers to the PRC. All of this ambiguity has resulted in the United States constantly walking on a diplomatic tightrope with regard to the China/Taiwan issue.
The ROC maintains formal diplomatic relations with 23 countries, mostly in Central America and Africa. Interestingly, the
Holy See also recognizes the ROC, a largely non-
Christian/
Catholic state, mainly to protest what it sees as the PRC's
suppression of the Catholic faith in mainland China. However,
Vatican diplomats were engaged in talks with PRC politicians at the time of
Pope John Paul II's death, with a view towards improving relations between the two countries. When asked, one Vatican diplomat suggested that relations with Taiwan might prove "expendable" should China be willing to engage in positive diplomatic relations with the Holy See. Under
Pope Benedict XVI the Vatican and China have shown greater interest in establishing ties, including the appointment of pro-Vatican bishops and the Pope canceling a planned visit from the
Dalai Lama.
During the
1990s, there was a diplomatic tug of war in which the PRC and ROC attempted to outbid each other to obtain the diplomatic support of small nations. This struggle seems to have slowed as a result of the PRC's growing economic power and doubts in Taiwan as to whether this aid was actually in the Republic of China's interest. In
March 2004,
Dominica switched recognition to the PRC in exchange for a large aid package. However, in late 2004,
Vanuatu briefly switched recognition from Beijing to Taipei, leading to the ousting of its Prime Minister and a return to its recognition of Beijing. On
January 20,
2005,
Grenada switched its recognition from Taipei to Beijing, in return for millions in aid (US$1,500 for every Grenadian).. However, on
May 14,
2005,
Nauru announced the restoration of formal diplomatic relations with Taipei after a three-year hiatus, during which it briefly recognized the People's Republic of China.
On
October 26,
2005,
Senegal broke off relations with the Republic of China and established diplomatic contacts with Beijing. The following year, on
August 5,
2006, Taipei ended relations with
Chad when Chad established relations with Beijing. On
April 26 2007, however,
Saint Lucia, which had previously severed ties with Taiwan following a change of government in December 1996, announced the restoration of formal diplomatic relations with Taipei. On
June 7,
2007,
Costa Rica broke off diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favour of the mainland. In January 2008 Malawi's foreign minister reported Malawi decided to cut diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China and recognize the People's Republic of China.
Currently, the countries who maintain formal diplomatic relations with the ROC include:
- (1989)
- (1994)
- (1957)
- (1961)
- (1995)
- (1960)
- (1956)
- (1965)
- (2003)
- (1998)
- (1980–2002, 2005)
- (1990)
|
(1999)
(1954)
(1957)
(1983)
(1984–1997, 2007)
(1981)
(1997)
(1983)
(1968)
(1979)
(The Holy See) (1942)
|
Under continuing pressure from the PRC to bar any representation of the ROC that may imply statehood, international organizations have adopted different policies toward the issue of Taiwan's participation. In cases where almost all UN members or sovereign states participate, such as the
World Health Organization)the ROC has been completely shut out, while in others, such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and
International Olympic Committee (IOC) the ROC participates under unusual names: "
Chinese Taipei" in the case of
APEC and the IOC, and the "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kimmen and Matsu" (often shortened as "Chinese Taipei") in the case of the WTO. The issue of Taiwan's name came under scrutiny during the 2006 World Baseball Classic. The organizers of the 16-team tournament intended to call Taiwan as such, but reverted to "Chinese Taipei" under pressure from China. The Taiwanese protested the decision, claiming that the WBC isn't an IOC event, but didn't prevail. The
ISO 3166 directory of names of countries and territories registers Taiwan (TW) separately from and in addition to the People's Republic of China (CN), but lists Taiwan as "Taiwan, Province of China" based on the name used by the UN under PRC pressure. In, Taiwan is also coded CN-71 under China, thus making Taiwan part of China in
ISO 3166-1 and
ISO 3166-2 categories.
Naming issues surrounding Taiwan/ROC continue to be a contentious issue in non-governmental organizations such as the
Lions Club, which faced considerable controversy naming its Taiwanese branch.
Controversies
Many political leaders who have maintained some form of One-China Policy have committed slips of the tongue in referring to
Taiwan as a country or as the
Republic of China.
United States presidents
Ronald Reagan and
George W. Bush have been known to have referred to Taiwan as a country during their terms of office. Although near the end of his term as
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said that
Taiwan isn't a state, he referred to
Taiwan as
the Republic of China twice during a testimony to the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
March 9,
2001. In the
People's Republic of China Premier
Zhu Rongji's farewell speech to the
National People's Congress, Zhu accidentally referred to
Mainland China and
Taiwan as two countries. There are also those from the PRC who informally refer to Taiwan as a country.
South Africa delegates once referred to Taiwan as the "
Republic of Taiwan" during
Lee Teng-hui's term as President of the ROC. In 2002,
Michael Bloomberg, the mayor of
New York, referred to Taiwan as a country. Most recently, former
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in a local Chinese newspaper in California in July 2005 that Taiwan is "a sovereign nation". The
People's Republic of China discovered the statement about three months after it was made.
In a controversial speech on February 4, 2006,
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso called
Taiwan a country with very high education levels because of previous
Japanese colonial rule over the island. One month later, he told a Japanese parliamentary committee that "[Taiwan's] democracy is considerably matured and
liberal economics is deeply ingrained, so it's a law-abiding country. In various ways, it's a country that shares a sense of values with Japan." At the same time, he admitted that "I know there will be a problem with calling [Taiwan] a country". Later, the
Japanese Foreign Ministry tried to downplay or reinterpret his remarks.
In
February 2007, the Royal
Grenada Police Band played
Taiwan's national anthem in an inauguration of the reconstructed
St George's Queen's Park Stadium funded by the PRC. Grenada had broken off diplomatic relationship with Taiwan just two years prior in favor of the PRC.
(External Link)
When the
Kuomintang visited
Mainland China in 2005, the government-controlled Chinese media called this event as a "visit," and called the KMT one of "Taiwan's political parties" even though the Kuomintang's full name remains the "Chinese Nationalist Party." Interestingly in Mainland China, there's a legal party called the
Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang that's officially one of the nine "consultative parties," according to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
The Chinese government has stated that it expresses a welcoming attitude towards Taiwanese businesspeople should they choose to return to the "motherland" for business purposes, but treats Taiwanese investment as "foreign investment". This is simply out of convenience, and the Chinese government also treats investment from Hong Kong "foreign investment", but this can result in confusion although the PRC clearly wouldn't consider Hong Kong or Taiwan to be foreign nations.
Possible military solutions and intervention
Until 1979, both sides intended to resolve the conflict militarily.
Intermittent clashes occurred throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with escalations comprising the
First and
Second Taiwan Strait crises. In
1979, with the U.S. change of diplomatic recognition to the PRC, the ROC lost its ally needed to "recover the mainland." Meanwhile, the PRC's desire to be accepted in the international community led it to promote peaceful unification under what would later be termed "
one country, two systems," rather than to "liberate Taiwan" and institute
socialism (in other words, to make Taiwan a
Special Administrative Region).
PRC's condition on military intervention
Notwithstanding, the PRC government has issued triggers for an immediate war with Taiwan, most notably via its controversial
Anti-Secession Law of 2005. These conditions are:
if events occur leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or
if a major event occurs which would lead to Taiwan's separation from China, or
if all possibility of peaceful unification is lost.
It has been interpreted that these criteria encompass the scenario of Taiwan developing nuclear weapons (see main article Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction).
Much saber-rattling by the mainland has been done over this, with Jiang Zemin, after assuming the mantle of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, becoming a leading voice.
The third condition has especially caused a stir in Taiwan as the term "indefinitely" is open to interpretation. It has also been viewed by some as meaning that preserving the ambiguous status quo isn't acceptable to the PRC, although the PRC stated on many occasions that there's no explicit timetable for reunification.
Concern over a formal declaration of de jure Taiwan independence is a strong impetus for the military buildup between Taiwan and mainland China. Some people believe that Taiwan will attempt a declaration of independence during the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. Others point out that the current US administration has publicly declared that given the status quo, it wouldn't aid Taiwan if it were to declare independence unilaterally.
According to ROC President Chen Shui-bian, China has accelerated the deployment of missiles against Taiwan to 120 a year, bringing the total arsenal to 706 ballistic missiles capable of being fitted with nuclear warheads that are aimed at Taiwan. Some believe that their deployment is a political tool on the part of the PRC to increase political pressure on Taiwan to abandon unilateral moves toward formal independence, at least for the time being, although the PRC government never declares such deployment publicly.
Balance of power
The possibility of war, the close geographical proximity of ROC-controlled Taiwan and PRC-controlled mainland China, and the resulting flare-ups that occur every few years, conspire to make this one of the most watched focal points in the Pacific. Both sides have chosen to have a strong naval presence. However, naval strategies between both powers greatly shifted in the 1980s and 1990s, while the ROC assumed a more defensive attitude by building and buying frigates and missile destroyers, and the PRC a more aggressive posture by developing long-range cruise missiles and supersonic Surface-to-surface missiles.
Although the People's Liberation Army Air Force is considered large, most of its fleet consists of older generationJ-7 fighters (localized MiG-21s and Mig-21BIs), raising doubts over the PLAAF's ability to control Taiwan's airspace in the event of a conflict. Since mid-1990s China has been purchasing, and later localizing, SU-27 based fighters. These Russian fighters, as well as their Chinese J11A variants, are currently over 170 in number, and have increased the effectiveness of PLAAF's Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capabilities. The introduction of 60 new-generation J10A fighters is anticipated to increase the PLAAF's firepower. China's acquisition of Russian Su30MKKs further enhanced the PLAAF's air-to-ground support ability. The ROC's air force, on the other hand, relies on Taiwan's second generation fighters, consisting of 150 US-built F-16 Fighting Falcons, approximately 60 French-built Mirage 2000-5s, and approximately 130 locally developed IDFs (Indigenous Defence Fighters). All of these ROC fighter jets are able to conduct BVR combat missions with BVR missiles, but the level of technology in mainland Chinese fighters is catching up.
In 2003, the ROC purchased four missile destroyers—the former USS Kidd class, and expressed a strong interest in the Arleigh Burke class. But with the growth of the PRC navy and air force, some doubt that the ROC could withstand a determined invasion attempt from mainland China in the future. These concerns have led to a view in certain quarters that Taiwanese independence, if it's to be implemented, should be attempted as early as possible, while the ROC still has the capacity to prevail in an all-out military conflict. Over the past three decades, estimates of how long Taiwan can withstand a full-scale invasion from across the Strait without any outside help have decreased from three months to only six days. Given such estimates, the US Navy has continued practicing "surging" its carrier groups, giving it the experience necessary to respond quickly to an attack on Taiwan. The US also collects data on the PRC's military deployments, through the use of spy satellites, for example. It would take days, if not weeks, for China to prepare for a full assault on Taiwan.
However, numerous reports issued by the PRC, ROC and US militaries make wildly mutually contradictory statements about the possible defense of Taiwan.
Naturally, war contingencies are not being planned in a vacuum. In 1979, the United States Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, a law generally interpreted as mandating U.S. defense of Taiwan in the event of an attack from the Chinese Mainland (the Act is applied to Taiwan and the Pescadores, but not to Quemoy and Matsu). The United States maintains the world's largest permanent fleet in the Pacific Region near Taiwan. The Seventh Fleet, operating primarily out of various bases in Japan, is a powerful naval contingent built upon the world's only permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. Although the stated purpose of the fleet isn't Taiwanese defense, it can be safely assumed from past actions that that's one of the reasons why the fleet is stationed in those waters.
Starting in 2000, Japan renewed its defense obligations with the US and embarked on a rearmament program, partly in response to fears that Taiwan might be invaded. Some analysts believed that the PRC could launch pre-emptive strikes on military bases in Japan to deter US and Japanese forces from coming to Taiwan's aid. Japanese strategic planners also see an independent Taiwan as vital, not only because Taiwan controls valuable shipping routes, but also because its capture by China would make Japan more vulnerable. During World War II, the US invaded the Philippines, but another viable target to enable direct attacks on Japan would have been Taiwan (then known as Formosa). However, critics of the pre-emptive strike theory assert that the PRC would be loath to give Japan and the US such an excuse to intervene.
A Taiwan software program simulating an attack by China reflects a win for Taiwan.
Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
In 1996, the PRC began conducting military exercises near Taiwan, and launched several ballistic missiles over the island. The saber-rattling was done in response to the possible re-election of then President Lee Teng-hui. The United States, under then President Clinton, sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region, sailing them into the Taiwan Strait. The PRC, unable to track the ships' movements, and probably unwilling to escalate the conflict, quickly backed down. The event had little impact on the outcome of the election, since none of Lee's contestants were strong enough to defeat him, but it's widely believed that the PRC's aggressive acts, far from intimidating the Taiwanese population, gave Lee a boost that pushed his share of votes over 50 percent.
The possibility of war in the Taiwan Straits, even though quite low in the short-term, requires the PRC, ROC, and U.S. to remain wary and vigilant. The goal of the three parties at the moment seems to be, for the most part, to maintain the status quo.
Developments since 2004 and future prospects
Judicial
On October 24, 2006, Dr. Roger C. S. Lin led a group of Taiwanese residents, including members of the Taiwan Nation Party, to file a Complaint for Declaratory Relief in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. According to their lawyer, Mr. Charles Camp, "[t]he Complaint asks the Court to declare whether the Taiwanese plaintiffs, including members of the Taiwan Nation Party, have certain rights under the United States Constitution". Their central argument is that, following Japanese renunciation of all rights and claims to Taiwan, Taiwan came under U.S. jurisdiction and remains so to this day. After an extension was granted, the United States government responded with a Motion to Dismiss on January 12, 2007, mostly on the basis that the United States government hasn't waived its sovereign immunity, that this is a political question not suitable for a court to determine, and that the Plaintiffs failed to nominate a specific grievance for relief.
The Plaintiffs were scheduled to reply on or before January 29, but later also extended to February 16. The bulk of the rebuttal was concentrated on countering the defendants' 'non-justiciable political question' argument, citing the Baker/Goldwater standard. Plaintiffs next argued that they've suffered an injury-in-fact from being denied a recognized nationality, and cites several statues and the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SPFT) in which the court was given jurisdiction and the United States waived its sovereign immunity over the matter. In the last sections, the Plaintiffs argued that they've stated specific claims for relief and that the law doesn't require them to introduce all or any claims when filing the complaint initially.
The Government was scheduled to reply by March 9, 2007, but once again an extension of two weeks was granted. Nonetheless, on March 23, the defendant's Motion to Dismiss the original complaint was denied "as moot [i]n light of the Amended Complaint filed" by the Plaintiffs on March 19. The Amended Complaint remains largely the same as the original, with minor structural changes, additional legal references, and, importantly, the inclusion of the Plaintiffs' failed attempts at applying for a U.S. passport on March 29, 2006, as a specific grievance.
The United States of America, however, again filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on April 5. The new motion specifies that America's legal relationship with Taiwan "derives solely and exclusively" from Executive Order 13014, and cites the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 which states that "'territories' shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores" as evidence that the United States then considered Taiwan part of the ROC. The Defendant asserted that the court doesn't have subject matter jurisdiction, mostly on the basis that sovereignty over a territory is a non-justiciable political question. The motion also argued that Plaintiffs' claim isn't one for which relief may be granted, on the grounds that the U.S. doesn't hold de jure sovereignty over Taiwan, and that therefore the Plaintiffs are not U.S. nationals who, under the Immigration Nationality Act, may bring a declaratory judgement action.
Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on April 19 to counter these arguments, stating that their complaint has been mischaracterized. The opening arguments are that the SFPT is the 'supreme law of the land' and overrides Executive Order 13014, and that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations specified no modification of the existing legal status of Taiwan by the Mutual Defense Treaty. Most of the motion was then devoted to arguing that this is a justiciable political case, as opposed to political questions non-justiciable under the Baker/Goldwater standard, and argued that the Court has power to determine the extent to which U.S. laws apply regardless of the Executive's position.
The Plaintiffs filed 31 pages of Discovery Requests on June 26, 2007.
The district court ruled March 18, 2008 that the case indeed presents a political question; as such, the court dismissed the complaint.
Political
Although the situation is confusing, most observers believe that it's stable with enough understandings and gentlemen's agreements to keep things from breaking out into open warfare. The current controversy is over the term one China, as the PRC insists that the ROC must recognize this term to begin negotiations. Although the ruling Democratic Progressive Party has moderated its support for Taiwan independence, there's still insufficient support within that party for President Chen Shui-bian to agree to one China. By contrast, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and People First Party (PFP) appear willing to agree to some variation of one China, and observers believed the position of the PRC was designed to sideline Chen until the 2004 presidential election where it was hoped that someone who was more supportive of Chinese reunification would come to power. Partly to counter this, Chen Shui-bian announced in July 2002 that if the PRC doesn't respond to Taiwan's goodwill, Taiwan may "go on its own ... road."
With Chen's re-election in 2004, Beijing's prospects for a speedier resolution were dampened, though they seemed strengthened again following the Pan-Blue majority in the 2004 legislative elections. However, public opinion in Taiwan reacted unfavorably towards the anti-secession law passed by the PRC in March 2005. Following two high profile visits by KMT and PFP party leaders to the PRC, the balance of public opinion appears to be ambiguous, with the Pan-Green Coalition gaining a majority in the 2005 National Assembly elections, but the Pan-Blue Coalition scoring a landslide victory in the 2005 municipal elections.
Public opinion
Public opinion in Taiwan regarding relations with the PRC is notoriously difficult to gauge, as poll results tend to be extremely sensitive to how the questions are phrased and what options are given, and there's a tendency by all political parties to spin the results to support their point of view.
According to a November 2005 poll from the Mainland Affairs Commission, 37.7% of people living in the ROC favor maintaining the status quo until a decision can be made in the future, 18.4% favors maintaining the status quo indefinitely, 14% favors maintaining the status quo until eventual independence, 12% favors maintaining the status quo until eventual reunification, 10.3% favors independence as soon as possible, and 2.1% favors reunification as soon as possible. According to the same poll, 78.3% are opposed to the "One Country, Two Systems" model, which was used for Hong Kong and Macau, while 10.4% is in favor.
Changing Taiwan’s status with respect to the ROC constitution
From the perspective of the ROC constitution, which the mainstream political parties such as the KMT and DPP currently respect and recognize, changing the ROC’s governing status or completely clarifying Taiwan’s political status would at best require amending the ROC constitution. In other words, if reunification supporters wanted to reunify Taiwan with the mainland in such a way that would effectively abolish the ROC or affect the ROC’s sovereignty, or if independence supporters wanted to abolish the ROC and establish a Republic of Taiwan, they'd need to amend the ROC constitution. Passing an amendment requires an unusually broad political consensus, which includes approval from three-quarters of a quorum of members of the Legislative Yuan. This quorum requires at least three-quarters of all members of the Legislature. After passing the legislature, the amendments need ratification from at least fifty percent of all eligible voters of the ROC, irrespective of voter turnout.
Given these harsh constitutional requirements, neither the pan-greens nor pan-blues can unilaterally change Taiwan’s political and legal status with respect to the ROC’s constitution. However, extreme Taiwan independence supporters view the ROC’s constitution as illegal and therefore believe that amendments to the ROC constitution are an invalid way to change Taiwan’s political status.
Note on terminology
Political status vs. Taiwan issue
Some scholarly sources as well as political entities like the PRC refer to Taiwan's controversial status as the "Taiwan question", "Taiwan issue", or "Taiwan problem" (台弯问题). The ROC government doesn't like these terminologies, emphasizing that it should be called the "Mainland issue" or "Mainland question", because from the ROC's point of view, the PRC is making an issue out of or creating a problem out of Taiwan. Others use the term "Taiwan Strait Question" because it implies nothing about sovereignty and because "Cross-Strait Relations" is a term used by both the ROC and the PRC to describe their interactions. However, this term is also objectionable to some because it still implies that there's an issue, which they feel is created only by the PRC.
De-facto vs. de-jure
The use of the terms de-facto and de-jure to describe Taiwan's as well as the Republic of China's status as a state is itself a contentious issue. This partially stems from the lack of precedents regarding derecognized, but still constitutionally functioning states. For instance, it's regularly argued that Taiwan satisfies the requirements of statehood at international law as stated in the Montevideo Convention. At the same time, there's continued debate on whether UN membership or recognition as a state by the UN is a decisive feature of statehood (since it represents broad recognition by the international community); the debate arises because non-state entities can often satisfy the Montevideo Convention factors, while the list of states recognised by the UN, for the most part, correlate well with entities recognised as states by customary international law. If the latter argument is accepted, then the Republic of China may have ceased to be a state post-1971 as a matter of international law ("de jure"), yet continued to otherwise function as the state that it previously was recognised as ("de facto").
From the 1990s onwards, media wire services sometimes describe Taiwan as having de-facto independence, whereas the Republic of China has always considered itself as a continuously functioning de-jure state.
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